Araneida Scanner: Silent Push Discovers Cracked Acunetix Web App & API Scanner

Key Findings

  • Silent Push Threat Analysts have discovered that the Araneida Scanner – which appears to be based in part on a cracked version of Acunetix, a popular web app vulnerability testing tool – is being used by threat actors for illegal purposes.
  • Beyond Araneida, our threat analysts found another cracked tool, with a login panel in Mandarin, that is likely also abusing a cracked version of Acunetix software for launching reconnaissance for future attacks.
  • Our investigation was prompted by one of our partners sharing information on a reconnaissance effort made against them.
  • Update 12.19.24: After Silent Push analysts shared our research with Brian Krebs of Krebs on Security, he published a report that connects the owner of Araneida to a software developer living in Ankara, Turkey. Read more at “Web Hacking Service ‘Araneida’ Tied to Turkish IT Firm


Executive Summary

Silent Push Threat Analysts have discovered that the Araneida Scanner, which appears to be based in part on a cracked version of Acunetix, a popular web app vulnerability testing tool, is being used for illegal purposes, including conducting offensive reconnaissance on potential target sites, scraping user data, and finding vulnerabilities for exploitation.

Araneida was recently used in a reconnaissance effort against one of our partners, which is what initially prompted our investigation.

Additional investigation has indicated that third parties are promoting Araneida on platforms such as Telegram and selling hundreds of thousands of stolen credential sets.

The Telegram channel provides guidance on using the tool for malicious purposes. Some threat actors using the Araneida scanner boast of taking over thousands of websites, using funds obtained from malicious activities to buy luxury cars, and reveling in wreaking chaos on tech websites.

Silent Push Enterprise users have access to two dedicated IOFA Feeds containing all the true positive domains and IP addresses we have gathered during our research.

For operational security reasons, we are unable to share the exact specifics of each query and pivots utilized. Silent Push Enterprise customers have access to a dedicated Araneida Scanner TLP: Amber report, which contains the relevant data types and pivot points we used to track the infrastructure referenced in this blog.


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Background

Silent Push Threat Analysts received intelligence from a partner organization that identified an aggressive scanning effort on their website using an IP address previously associated with a FIN7 campaign. However, we didn’t have full confidence that FIN7 controlled the IP address at the time of the scanning. The IP address featured specific metadata, “Araneida Customer Panel,” which we quickly confirmed was a key to uncovering more unique IP addresses hosting this service.

Our team discovered that a scanning tool called “Araneida – WebApp Scanner” is being publicly sold and used by threat actors to conduct offensive reconnaissance on potential target websites, scrape user data, and find vulnerabilities for exploitation.

We also discovered another cracked tool that is owned by an entity that uses Mandarin on its login page and an HTML title in Mandarin. Silent Push Threat Analysts haven’t found a public sales process for this product yet, but the same Chinese-language panel has been hosted on 20 unique IP addresses, indicating some diversity in deployments.

Both appear to be based on cracked, unauthorized versions of Acunetix, a popular web app vulnerability testing tool.

Araneida was recently used in a reconnaissance effort against one of our partners, which initiated our current investigation. Both Araneida and the Chinese language panel using this cracked enterprise software could be used for reconnaissance prior to launching sophisticated offensive attacks.

Our team has executed granular content scans in the Silent Push Web Scanner to locate and traverse Indicators Of Future Attacks (IOFAs) related to the cracked Acunetix control panel infrastructure.

Araneida admins are also actively marketing the tool’s criminal capabilities on Telegram and selling hundreds of thousands of credential sets stolen through Araneida.

Both threat actors are using legacy Acunetix SSL certificates on active control panels, which provides a solid pivot for finding some of this infrastructure, particularly from the Chinese threat actors.

The Araneida Scanner has a unique setup that is important for defenders to understand in order to detect and block:

  • After acquiring the Araneida Scanner, a user is given the client as a Windows executable (.exe) file. ​
  • The user installs the executable file, logs into the Araneida client, and is directed to follow specific steps to set up the scanner.
  • ​Araneida is a noisy scanner. If the tool is being used against any of your hosts, you will see requests attempting to connect to various endpoints and making requests to random URLs associated with specific CMS/products:

Araneida Scanner requests attempting to connect to various endpoints
Araneida Scanner requests attempting to connect to various endpoints


Initial Intelligence: Suspicious Website Scanning

Based on the intelligence shared with us by a partner regarding the aggressive scanning effort, our team began researching an IP address that had hosted content and specific metadata.

We quickly confirmed the data and that additional websites were using this unique Araneida hosting service. Further investigation of these websites revealed they shared proprietary information associated with Acunetix.

Silent Push research found the websites in question shared information with Acunetix
Our research found the websites in question also shared information associated with Acunetix

The utility used to scan our partner’s network featured the name “Araneida” but also used information from Acunetix, suggesting the presence of cracked software.

After making this assumption, our team contacted the Invicti team, which owns the Acunetix product, and they quickly confirmed our suspicions.

The Invicti team confirmed that a cracked version of Acunetix was being sold. They also confirmed that there were no impacts on their clients—the integrity of data at Invicti was never at risk, and this is an isolated incident.

We appreciated the Invicti team’s quick and transparent confirmation and the additional details they provided.

First Public Mentions of Araneida & Acunetix in 2023

Several threat intelligence vendors and researchers discussed Araneida publicly on June 5, 2023, with FalconFeeds[.]io apparently being the first to share details:

Screenshot of FalconFeeds first to share details of Araneida Scanner
x[.]com/FalconFeedsio/status/1665690661377691649

On the same day, Chris Duggan of TLP R3D Intelligence was the first to connect Araneida to Acunetix:

Chris Duggan of TLP R3D was first to connect Araneida with Acunetix
x[.]com/TLP_R3D/status/1665777020767293447

Duggan was also the first to flag the domain that is still selling the Araneida Scanner: araneida[.]co

Duggan was also first to flag the domain still selling Araneida Scanner
x[.]com/TLP_R3D/status/1665778273639448580

Investigating Araneida

Our team was able to determine that the Araneida Scanner is still being sold in 2024 via araneida[.]co, which was a domain created in February 2023:

Silent Push Total View screen highlighting site still selling Araneida Scanner
Silent Push Total View highlight of araneida[.]co

Araneida acquisition screen
Araneida acquisition screen

Inside the scanner product, this is what the client looks like after login:

Example screen of client login to Araneida Scanner

This is a brief video showing the features in the Araneida Scanner:

The video clip above highlights features in the Araneida scanning product

Between September 2023 and March 2024, 36 unique IP addresses hosted a page referencing the “Araneida Customer Panel.” The fact that we hadn’t seen any results since March 2024 indicated that the network operators changed their deployment behaviors.

During the course of our research, we realized there was a second threat actor beyond Araneida likely using a cracked version of Acunetix.

Araneida Telegram Channel

The cracked software has nearly 500 members in their Telegram channel at t[.]me/araneida_official.

The Telegram channel provides guidance on how to use the tool for malicious purposes and boasts of having “taken over more than 30K websites in 6 months,” with operators using the funds obtained to buy “a Porsche from the dumps he sold,” and claims that “Tech websites, especially french ones aren’t happy because of Araneida :)

Telegram channel stating fun facts about Araneida Scanner
t[.]me/araneida_official

In July 2024, the Telegram channel admins also promoted a Selenium-based “Netflix Checker” tool, which scrapes cookies, payment information, and personal details from Netflix accounts:

Telegram example of Araneida Scanner Netflix scraper promo
t[.]me/araneida_official Netflix scraper promo

The Telegram channel operators also sell email and password dumps that are likely acquired using their tool, such as the example (below) with hundreds of thousands of login credentials obtained from a UK website:

Telegram example of Araneida credential sale
t[.]me/araneida_official credential sale

Chinese Portals Likely Using a Cracked Acunetix Scanner

Continuing our research soon led to the identification of a version of the hosts with the legacy Acunetix SSL, which used Mandarin on their login page.

The first results for this legacy Acunetix SSL on a page with Mandarin language appeared in 2023, and many of the websites are still live, hosting a login portal (as of December 2024):

The page translated into English:

Araneida translated page offers two files available for download
The login page offers two files available for download

On these login pages, there are two files available for download. One file appears to be a “plugin” labeled “UkeyService_pre” and the other is labeled “Customer End” with a .exe file called “FlkVPN

These hosts feature a self-signed SSL certificate issued by Acunetix three years ago, which appears to be different from the certificates used on the legitimate Acunetix corporate infrastructure:

Hosts feature a self-signed SSL certificate issued by Acunetix in 2021
These hosts feature a self-signed SSL certificate issued by Acunetix in 2021


Other Threat Actors Abusing Acunetix

Several instances of threat actors misusing Acunetix have been reported since as recently as 2020.

In November 2020, a joint advisory from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that an Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) actor was using an Acunetix vulnerability scanner to target U.S. state and election websites to obtain voter registration data.

In March 2024, Lumen reported that the Faceless proxy service had one IP address being used as a relay to communicate with “Moon and/or Faceless C2s” and that it had an Acunetix web vulnerability scanner service running on two ports.

More recently, in May 2024, APT41, the Chinese Cyber threat actors, were highlighted by Natto Thoughts in using Acunetix in their offensive reconnaissance efforts. Natto Thoughts cited a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) report, which lists Acunetix as the first “well-known security tool” used by APT41:

“APT41 also uses well-known security tools, such as Acunetix, Nmap, JexBoss, Sqlmap, a customized version of Cobalt Strike, and fofa[.]su, which is roughly a Chinese equivalent of the popular website Shodan.

To conduct reconnaissance, they are known to use the previously-mentioned Acunetix and Nmap, as well as Sqlmap, OneForAll, subdomain3, subDomainsBrute, and Sublist3r. They frequently use spear-phishing as an infection vector, but are also heavily reliant on SQL injections to initially penetrate a target organization.”

The Chinese organizations using a cracked version of Acunetix could be associated with APT41 but we currently have no additional details connecting the efforts.


Continuing to Track Cracked Acunetix / Araneida Scanner

Silent Push threat researchers will continue to observe and monitor changes to this actor’s infrastructure. New discoveries and TTP changes will be immediately reflected in our feeds.

We’ve also published a TLP: Amber report for Enterprise users that contains links to the specific queries we’ve used to identify and traverse the cracked Acunetix Scanner infrastructure—including proprietary queries and specific analysis that we have omitted from this blog.

Mitigation

Silent Push believes all cracked Acunetix Scanner hosts offer some level of risk.

Our analysts have constructed a Silent Push IOFA Feed that provides a list of Araneida Scanner Indicator of Future Attack domains focused on their scams, along with an IOFA Feed containing suspect Araneida Scanner IP addresses.

Silent Push IOFA Feeds are available as part of an Enterprise subscription. Enterprise users can ingest IOFA Feed data into their security stack to inform their detection protocols or use it to pivot across attacker infrastructure using the Silent Push Console and Feed Analytics screen.


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Sample Indicators of Future Attacks (IOFAs)

157.254.237[.]94

163.5.169[.]250

163.5.169[.]45

163.5.210[.]49

163.5.32[.]179

163.5.32[.]202

163.5.32[.]203

163.5.32[.]204

163.5.32[.]72

205.234.181[.]204

23.26.77[.]145

Machina Records Partnership with Silent Push

Machina Record Partners with Silent Push Offering a Preemptive Cyber Defense Solution to Stop Attacks and Prevent Damage

Attacker Behaviors are Identified Before They Strike Through Indicators of Future Attacks (IOFA) Data from Silent Push.

Tokyo, Japan, Dec 17, 2024. Machina Record Co. Ltd., a cyber threat intelligence consultancy, announced its partnership with Silent Push to offer early global threat detection services to its customers to block attacks and reduce the risk of reputational loss. 

Threat actors continue to advance their strategies leveraging GenAI to quickly form an attack. Without preemptive cyber defense, companies are exposed and vulnerable to hidden adversary infrastructure. Silent Push provides a complete view of emerging threat infrastructure in real-time, revealing cyber-attackers and malicious intent all within a single platform. 

Yusuke Gunji Machina Record CEO, stated, “Silent Push shares in our mission to make the world a safer and more secure society. Together we can enable our customers to stabilize and protect their organization by stopping attackers before they strike. Effective cyber intelligence goes beyond collecting and analyzing large amounts of information from the Internet. The unique approach from Silent Push is delivered with precision and speed to help you stay ahead of adversaries.”  

“Too often legacy solutions just rely on Indicators of Compromise (IOC) with limited visibility and missing data. We go beyond IOCs and expose Indicators of Future Attacks through our proprietary behavioral threat modeling; allowing security teams to identify detailed and unique patterns that reveal attacker campaigns before they even start—neutralizing threats and avoiding damage, said Ken Bagnall, Silent Push CEO. We welcome this partnership with Machina Record in Japan to help organizations quickly pinpoint malicious actors and disrupt their plans,” added Ken Bagnall. 

Machina Record encourages its customers to experience the power and effectiveness of the Silent Push platform through the free community edition. Learn more here. 

About Machina Record

Machina Record is a cyber threat intelligence consultancy. Its leading data aggregation platform collects and organizes vast amounts of publicly available data from across the internet, providing organizations with a comprehensive view of individuals, entities, and online activity. Machina Record partners with emerging and innovative partners to provide the most impactful solutions across the globe. For more information, visit www.MachinaRecord.com.


Ready to dive deeper into the world of preemptive threat intelligence? Begin your journey with the Silent Push free Community Edition today.

Google Advertising Out to Lunch? Simple Pivots Catch an Ongoing Malvertising Campaign Hiding in Plain Sight

Key Findings

  • Silent Push Threat Analysts have caught a threat actor’s ongoing series of malvertising campaigns blatantly abusing Google Search ads to target graphic design professionals.
  • We documented at least 10 malvertising campaigns hosted exclusively on two IP addresses: 185.11.61[.]243 and 185.147.124[.]110.
  • Together with our research partners, we found that the sites from the two IP addresses were being launched in Google Search advertising campaigns, and all of them led to malicious downloads.

Executive Summary

When it comes to tracking threat actors, Silent Push Threat Analysts understand this process can be complex, and it’s not uncommon for certain organizations to track one threat actor more effectively than others. These types of cases generally occur due to gaps in visibility or a lack of access to certain intelligence.

Conducting a simple process to look up which IP address is hosting a domain and then investigating that IP address for other similar domains, however, is not a complex task. It’s a beginner pivot, something any junior threat analyst can accomplish.

And yet, it appears that the Google advertising team is not even going that far to stop a series of malvertising campaigns that have been going on for nearly a month, targeting graphic design professionals.

Domains have been launched day after day, week after week, since at least November 13, 2024, for malvertising campaigns hosted on two dedicated IP addresses: 185.11.61[.]243 and 185.147.124[.]110.

Sites stemming from these two IP ranges are being launched in Google Search advertising campaigns, and all lead to a variety of malicious downloads, according to our research partners.

In the last month, Silent Push Threat Analysts have documented at least ten distinct malvertising campaigns, launched via Google ads, that make use of domains mapped to one of these two IP ranges.


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Dedicated Ranges Clearly Owned by a Single Threat Actor

Starting with the first IP address 185.11.61[.]243, at the time of this writing, 109 unique domains were mapped to it, all seemingly for this graphic design/CAD malvertising campaign. The first domains were added on July 29, 2024, and the most recent domains mapped to it were from November 25, 2024:

Screenshot of domains mapped to 185.11.61[.]243

Meanwhile, 185.147.124[.]110 currently has 85 unique domains mapped to it, with the first domains added on November 25, 2024, and the newest domains mapped as recently as December 13, 2024:

Screenshot of domains mapped to 185.147.124[.]110

On November 13, 2024, the malvertising campaign first launched with frecadsolutions[.]com, hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 since November 6, 2024. From here, we noticed that the IP address hosted dozens of other similar domains and assumed they could be for similar malvertising purposes.

The first malvertising campaign was launched with frecadsolutions[.]com

On November 14, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched using frecadsolutions[.]cc (note the subtle TLD difference of “cc” vs. “com”), which had also been hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 since November 6, 2024. This made use of Bitbucket for its malicious download, which is normally a legitimate file hosting site.

Next, a second malvertising campaign was launched using frecadsolutions[.]cc

On November 26, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched on freecad-solutions[.]net, which had been hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 from November 1, 2024 to November 26, 2024, and then moved to 185.147.124[.]110, where it has since remained.

A third malvertising campaign was launched on freecad-solutions[.]net

On November 27, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched on frecadsolutions[.]org, which had been hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 from November 6, 2024 to November 26, 2024, and then moved to 185.147.124[.]110, where it has since remained.

The fourth malvertising campaign was launched on frecadsolutions[.]org

On November 27, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched with rhino3dsolutions[.]io, which had been hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 from November 17, 2024, to November 26, 2024, and then on 185.147.124[.]110 from November 26, 2024, to present.

A fifth malvertising campaign was launched with rhino3dsolutions[.]io

On November 27, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched with rhino3dsolutions[.]org, which had been hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 from November 18, 2024, to November 26, 2024, and then on 185.147.124[.]110 from November 27, 2024, to present.

The sixth malvertising campaign was launched with rhino3dsolutions[.]org

On November 27, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched with rhino3dsolutions[.]net, which had been hosted on 185.11.61[.]243 from November 17, 2024, to November 26, 2024, and then on 185.147.124[.]110 from November 26, 2024 to present.

A seventh malvertising campaign was launched with rhino3dsolutions[.]net

On December 5, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched with planner5design[.]net, which had been hosted on 185.147.124[.]110 from December 1, 2024 to December 6, 2024.

The eighth malvertising campaign was launched with planner5design[.]net

On December 9, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched with onshape3d[.]org, which had been hosted on 185.147.124[.]110 from December 1, 2024, to present.

The ninth malvertising campaign was launched with onshape3d[.]org

On December 10, 2024, a malvertising campaign was launched with frecad3dmodeling[.]org that had been hosted on 185.147.124[.]110 from December 8, 2024, to present.

A tenth malvertising campaign was launched with frecad3dmodeling[.]org

Special Thanks to Our Research Partners

Silent Push analysts would like to thank the collaboration with our research partner, Jérôme Segura from Malwarebytes, who initially highlighted these malvertising domains. By partnering together in trusted research-sharing circles, we’re able to find and highlight complex threats such as these – and for those efforts, we salute you.

If you are interested in joining a research-sharing effort or simply have interesting threats to share that you would like our help with, please feel free to reach out to us at info@silentpush[.]com.


Mitigation

Silent Push believes all malvertising domains pose significant risks, especially to corporate environments.

Our analysts have constructed a Silent Push IOFA Feed that provides a list of Indicators of Future Attack domains focused on malvertising, along with an IOFA Feed containing suspect Malvertising IPs.

Silent Push IOFA Feeds are available as part of an Enterprise subscription. Enterprise users can ingest IOFA Feed data into their security stack to inform their detection protocols or use it to pivot across attacker infrastructure using the Silent Push Console and Feed Analytics screen.


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Indicators of Future Attacks (IOFAs)

Here is a sample list of IOFAs – our full list is available for enterprise users. Silent Push Enterprise clients have access to a domain and IP feed containing this malvertising infrastructure.

  • 185.147.124[.]110
  • 185.11.61[.]243
  • calibrebook[.]com
  • calibrebook[.]net
  • frecad3dmodeling[.]net
  • frecad3dmodeling[.]org
  • frecad3dsolutions[.]com
  • frecad3d-solutions[.]com
  • frecad-3dsolutions[.]com
  • frecad3d-solutions[.]net
  • frecad-3dsolutions[.]net
  • frecad3dsolutions[.]org
  • frecad-3dsolutions[.]org
  • frecaddevelop[.]com
  • frecaddevelop[.]org
  • frecaddevelopment[.]com
  • frecaddevelopment[.]net
  • frecaddevelopment[.]org
  • frecadmodeling[.]com
  • frecadmodeling[.]net
  • frecadmodeling[.]org
  • frecadsolution[.]net
  • frecadsolutions[.]cc
  • frecadsolutions[.]org
  • frecad-solutions[.]org
  • freecad3dsolution[.]net
  • freecad3dsolutions[.]com
  • freecadblog[.]com
  • freecadblog[.]io
  • freecadblog[.]net
  • freecadblogs[.]net
  • freecad-solutions[.]net
  • freecadsolutionsllc[.]com
  • freeecadmodeling[.]net
  • onshape3d[.]com
  • onshape3d[.]org
  • onshapedev[.]net
  • onshapedevelop[.]com
  • onshapedevelop[.]net
  • onshapedevelop[.]org
  • planner5ddevelop[.]com
  • planner5ddevelop[.]net
  • planner5design[.]com
  • planner5design[.]net
  • planner5designs[.]com
  • planner5designs[.]org
  • recad3dsolutions[.]org
  • rhino3dsolutions[.]io
  • rhino3dsolutions[.]net
  • rhino3dsolutions[.]org
  • rhinoceros-3d[.]com